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PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AND THE EXTRINSIC VALUE 
OF ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY
JANE GATLEY
Abstract: External pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom 
has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. 
One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes 
from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of lit-
erature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of 
the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic 
value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem 
within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three 
claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into 
the value of P4C to claims about the value of non-P4C philosophy. It argues that 
more research is needed to investigate the value of non-P4C philosophy.
Keywords: metaphilosophy, P4C philosophy, philosophy of education, teaching 
philosophy.
Introduction
As universities strive to demonstrate the relevance and value of their work, 
academic philosophy departments have compelling reasons to turn to lit-
erature about Philosophy for Children (P4C). This paper explores the re-
lationship between P4C and philosophy, concluding that the relationship 
is complicated to the extent that claims about the value of P4C might not 
be true of academic philosophy, and vice versa. Transferring the rationale 
behind P4C to academic philosophy is not always warranted; similarly, the 
P4C model is not always the best pedagogy for bringing about the poten-
tial benefits of academic philosophy. In what follows I set out three rea-
sons  to back up these claims, all  related to  the distinctive nature of the 
P4C model. These reasons are that (1) adhering to a principled P4C model 
can preclude certain benefits of academic philosophy from being realised; 
(2) the benefits of P4C might not hold true of other models of academic 
philosophy; and (3) it is plausible that the benefits of P4C are more closely 
related to its focus on dialogue and could be achieved by non-philosophi-
cal means. I conclude that more research is needed into the extrinsic value 
of non-P4C models of philosophy. Experimenting with existing and new 
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methods of engaging in philosophy  is necessary to ensure that progress 
can be made towards identifying how, why, and when philosophy is rele-
vant and valuable to wider society.
The Extrinsic Value of Philosophy
Claims about the extrinsic value of philosophy form part of the justifica-
tion for the public funding of academic philosophy departments. By ex-
trinsic value, I mean the value of philosophy as a means of bringing about 
(1) personal goods, such as enhanced well-being, better decision-making 
abilities, and critical thinking skills, and (2) societal goods, such as greater 
democratic engagement, improved communication between community 
groups, and social cohesion. The greater the impact of philosophy depart-
ments on these goods, the easier it is to argue that philosophical research 
and teaching should be publicly funded. At least, this sort of reasoning 
has proved persuasive to policy makers.
Emphasis on  the extrinsic value of philosophy is  growing due to 
external pressure. In the United Kingdom, the Research Excellence 
Framework  (REF)  incentivises certain forms of public-facing philosophy 
by measuring the “impact” of university departments. Here, “research car-
ried out at HEIs [Higher Education Institutes] should, in at least some cases, 
lead to some positive social or economic benefit to non-academic part-
ners” (REF 2014, 6). The apparent trend is that this pressure will increase. 
The United Kingdom is introducing a Knowledge Excellence Framework 
(KEF), which focuses exclusively on the societal impact of research. The pro-
posed aim of this is “enhancing the contribution higher education makes 
to the economy and society” by providing “specific funds and support that 
encourages them to do this more effectively” (HEFCE 2018).
A quick exploration of impact case studies submitted for the 2014 REF 
brings up a number of instances of submissions that take a P4C approach, for 
example Philosophy in the City: Inspiring the Next Generation, submitted 
by the University of Sheffield, and Philosophical Dialogue and Rhetoric 
Creating an Alternative Space for Thinking Together,  submitted by St. 
Mary’s University. Both of these projects were centred on doing philos-
ophy with members of the public using a P4C approach (REF 2018). In 
addition, many departments are now offering their undergraduates oppor-
tunities to engage in P4C-type philosophy for credit, with the universities 
of Bristol, Leeds, Nottingham, and Sheffield running modules in which 
students take philosophy into schools to engage in public-facing philoso-
phy themselves. These case studies and modules are responses to the pres-
sure to demonstrate impact, through extrinsically valuable philosophical 
activity.
While my focus is on the situation in the United Kingdom, a simi-
lar picture  appears elsewhere. In the “Department Advocacy Toolkit” 
© 2020 The Authors. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd
550 JANE GATLEY
published by the American Philosophical Association, P4C is listed as a 
method of “community involvement,” and public engagement is noted as 
a pressing concern for “all departments, but especially those at risk,”  in 
the U.S. system (APA 2017, 27 and 40).  P4C is a global phenomenon, 
and there is no clear reason why its allure would not be felt by philosophy 
departments elsewhere under the same pressure to demonstrate the extrin-
sic value of their work. While many philosophy departments do not turn 
to P4C to demonstrate the extrinsic value of philosophy, many do, and it 
seems likely that many more will do so in future.
Philosophy for Children
P4C refers  to a loosely related set of models for doing philosophy that 
trace their roots back to Matthew Lipman’s work to develop a pedagogy 
for teaching  thinking skills through  philosophy.  The following excerpt 
from an interview provides Lipman’s account of the origins of P4C: “Back 
in the early ’70s, when my own children were about 10 or 11 years old, the 
school they were attending did not give them the instruction in reasoning 
that I thought they needed. I was teaching logic at the college level at the 
time, and I felt that I wasn’t accomplishing very much with my students be-
cause it was too late, they should have had instruction in reasoning much 
earlier”  (Brandt 1988, 34). Since its introduction by Lipman, P4C has 
spread across the world, with the International Council of Philosophical 
Inquiry with Children  (ICPIC)  listing  sixty-three countries involved in 
P4C (ICPIC 2016). Simultaneously, P4C has developed  into  a  diversity 
of approaches, which makes any definitive account of P4C problematic. 
Accordingly, I restrict my exposition of P4C to approaches that emphasise 
use of the Community of Inquiry (CoI) or analogous pedagogies. I refer 
to these as principled P4C approaches, since they take the Deweyan prin-
ciples behind Lipman’s model of P4C seriously.
Lipman was influenced by Dewey’s view that “what should be hap-
pening in the classroom is thinking. . . . The route he [Dewey] proposed 
. . . is that the educational process in the classroom should take as its 
model the process of scientific inquiry” (Lipman 2003, 14).  Following 
this approach, the focus of a principled P4C model is on inquiry with the 
aim of developing critical, creative, and caring thinking amongst par-
ticipants  through  open-ended  philosophical  dialogue  (Lipman 2003). 
Understanding the importance of Dewey’s  influence on Lipman  is key 
to understanding the CoI. For Dewey, education aims to help children to 
develop. This entails “continual reorganising, reconstructing [and] trans-
forming” of a child’s experiences (Dewey 1916, 59). Since the CoI derives 
from this Deweyan understanding of education, in order to enact a CoI in 
a classroom it is important that “a community of inquiry attempts to fol-
low the inquiry where it leads rather than be penned in by the boundary 
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lines of existing disciplines” (Lipman 2003, 20). P4C is thus committed, in 
a principled way, to open-ended dialogue and minimal teacher-led exposi-
tion. It is worth noting that Dewey did not write about or propose the CoI, 
but it is a Dewey-inspired approach that gives P4C a distinctive nature and 
value.
A useful distinction in coming to understand the CoI is Michael Hand’s 
distinction between directive and non-directive  teaching. Directive teach-
ing has “the aim of persuading,” while non-directive teaching “has no per-
suasive aim” (Hand 2018, 37). Directive teaching can include dialogue and 
does not imply didactic teaching. Hand gives the example of two teachers 
who both present children with a video debate about “whether there is a 
justified moral requirement to vote in general elections” (37). The non- 
directive teacher facilitates a class discussion whilst remaining neutral. The 
directive teacher “ensures that (what he takes to be) the sound arguments 
for the requirement, and the sound objections to arguments against it, are 
thoroughly aired and understood, either by giving the floor to pupils able 
to articulate them or by feeding them into the discussion himself” (37–38). 
In both cases, students are engaged in dialogue, but in one case the teacher 
is neutral and in the other the teacher is not. P4C is non-directive for prin-
cipled reasons, meaning that teachers should facilitate without guiding the 
discussion and that any content must be presented in stimulus form rather 
than developed by the teacher. To directively engage in P4C would under-
mine the CoI’s emphasis on child-centred inquiry.
The following account of P4C by Joanna Haynes is a fair representa-
tion of a typical principled P4C session: participants are asked to pause for 
thought, either through small-group discussion or pair work or in silence. 
The next step involves questioning. In some sessions this is spontaneous 
and natural, but in others children’s questions are written on a board and 
grouped to allow children to vote on the questions they would like to start 
with. Group discussion is then facilitated with the aim of building on one 
another’s ideas. The teacher should record the discussion and aim for clo-
sure at the end of the session with some form of review (Haynes 2008, 
31–38). While the content of  P4C  sessions will vary depending on the 
desires of the participants, the structure of the session is prescribed and 
distinctive compared to other activities undertaken at school. It is this pre-
scribed structure, based on the CoI, that I am referring to when I speak of 
the principled P4C model.
The  principled P4C model is dominant in the United Kingdom. 
SAPERE  (Society for the Advancement of  Philosophical Enquiry and 
Reflection in Education) is  the  largest  U.K.-based  organisation  offer-
ing training and guidance for those wishing to do philosophy in communi-
ties. The society’s mission statement reads: “We train teachers in Philosophy 
for Children which encourages children to think critically, creatively, 
collaboratively and caringly” (SAPERE 2018).  The  SAPERE  model of 
P4C is clearly CoI based: “Children are taught how to create their own 
© 2020 The Authors. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd
552 JANE GATLEY
philosophical questions. They then choose one question that is the focus 
of a philosophical enquiry, or dialogue. . . . The teacher, as facilitator, 
supports the children in their thinking, reasoning and questioning, as well 
as the way the children speak and listen  to each other in the dialogue” 
(SAPERE 2018).  SAPERE  takes  a  principled  stance against  directive 
inquiry.  The only guidance permitted by the facilitator is to encourage 
critical, caring, and creative thinking.
It is  worth noting  that the second-largest P4C organisation in the 
United Kingdom,  the Philosophy Foundation,  takes a less principled   
approach and allows for some directive teaching, in particular to introduce 
philosophical problems. Nonetheless,  the Philosophy Foundation   
still emphasises what it calls “philosophical enquiry” and its own “dialec-
tical method of facilitation . . . with minimal interference from the facil-
itator” (Philosophy Foundation 2018). More broadly, P4C is not always 
principled, but many of the approaches to doing philosophy that associ-
ate themselves with P4C draw inspiration from the principled model and 
share a commitment to some form of non-directive dialogue-based group 
inquiry, such as the CoI. Furthermore, much of the research conducted 
into the extrinsic value of P4C takes principled P4C approaches as its sub-
ject (e.g., Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015).
The Appeal of P4C to Academic Philosophy Departments
Philosophical activities that aim to bring about extrinsic goods (for ex-
ample, public-facing philosophy) are  increasingly  influenced by the lit-
erature and methods associated with P4C. The philosophy departments 
offering undergraduate modules for teaching philosophy in schools have 
affiliations with P4C organisations that provide training. The module in 
Sheffield works  with  SAPERE  and  the Philosophy Foundation.  Bristol 
and Leeds are both affiliated with Thinking Space, which has close ties 
with SAPERE. There are several reasons why this strong relationship be-
tween P4C and public-facing philosophy is developing and should be ex-
pected to develop further.
The organisations promoting P4C, at least in the United Kingdom, have 
excellent reputations. They are well organised and well resourced and play 
an important  role in creating and publicising research into the impor-
tance of philosophy. For example, SAPERE claims to have trained more 
than twenty-seven thousand teachers (SAPERE 2018). Anyone wishing 
to demonstrate his or her credentials to an external organisation would 
be justified in turning to SAPERE for accredited training. Furthermore, 
SAPERE has worked hard to promote P4C in the media and to ensure 
that high-quality research into the benefits of P4C has been conducted 
and publicised. In particular,  SAPERE’s  work with the  Educational 
Endowment Foundation  in conjunction with Durham University led to 
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the influential evaluation of P4C demonstrating that P4C sessions were 
correlated with improvements in children’s reading and mathematics scores 
(Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015). P4C is thus established, respected, and 
effective. At first glance it seems like an ideal model for philosophy depart-
ments to adopt with the extrinsic value of philosophy in mind.
Alongside empirical research into the benefits of P4C on cognitive test 
scores (Trickey and Topping 2004; Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015), a range 
of further benefits of P4C have been proposed. These can be summarised 
as  cognitive: P4C improves  critical thinking skills (Lipman 2003);  non- 
cognitive: P4C develops social skills, confidence, and communication skills 
(Fisher 2013; Haynes 2008; Siddiqui, Gorard, and See 2017); emancipa-
tory: P4C is a critical pedagogy that reverses harmful power dynamics in 
schools (Haynes and Murris 2011); political: P4C is an essential element 
of education for democratic societies (Fisher 2013); hedonic: philosophy is 
enjoyable and natural to children (Matthews 1980); and moral: P4C devel-
ops moral and epistemic virtues (Fisher 2013; Hobbs 2018).
This wealth of empirical and theoretical research into the extrinsic 
value of P4C provides grounds for holding that the philosophical activi-
ties undertaken in academic philosophy departments might have similarly 
rich extrinsic value for individuals and society. Even if the benefits are not 
clearly transferrable between P4C and academic departments, departments 
might be tempted to engage in P4C-type philosophical activities in their 
public-facing work. The cognitive, non-cognitive, emancipatory, political, 
hedonic, and moral benefits  are all worthy goals and mean that P4C is 
enthusiastically implemented by a lively international community of prac-
titioners (Gregory, Haynes, and Murris 2017, xxi). P4C has a large body of 
literature associated with it that highlights many benefits to society, making 
it an attractive model for departments wanting to demonstrate impact.
I am concerned with the relationship between philosophical activities 
conducted by academic philosophy departments and P4C. While the ben-
efits of P4C ground a convincing case for the extrinsic value of P4C, I will 
outline issues that arise if  research into P4C is taken to ground claims 
about the extrinsic value of a broader range of philosophical activities 
without due rigour and care. Focusing on the P4C benefits listed is unprob-
lematic if  the benefits of P4C are the same as the benefits of other models 
of doing philosophy, but I will argue that they are not necessarily  iden-
tical, meaning that it is unclear what the extrinsic value of other models 
of philosophy, including approaches prevalent in academic philosophy, 
might be.
P4C Can Restrict the Potential Extrinsic Value of Philosophy
The first potential problem of adopting a P4C model is that doing so 
might preclude some valuable aspects of philosophical research from 
© 2020 The Authors. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd
554 JANE GATLEY
being communicated. For example, a public lecture or directively taught 
lesson might be a more effective means of communicating important phil-
osophical ideas developed in academic philosophy departments. Little re-
search  exists into the  extrinsic  value of some of the more expositional 
or directive aspects of philosophy. My first point is that there might be 
some additional value to  non-P4C  models of philosophy teaching and 
outreach, such as lectures, books, radio programmes, film screenings, and 
directive teaching, that would be prevented from being realised if  the P4C 
model were strictly followed at all times.
P4C has specific educational aims that on a principled P4C approach 
threaten to overrule other potential aims.  Gert Biesta  points out that 
the aims of P4C are not necessarily the only aims possible when bring-
ing philosophy into schools, or by extension any other public-facing phi-
losophy.  Since  philosophy is a very broad and potentially undefinable 
field,  “the question as to what philosophy might achieve is difficult to 
answer because philosophy in its many forms and guises may achieve many 
things” (Biesta 2011, 306). P4C might be a poor instrument for attempting 
to optimise the extrinsic value of the aspects of philosophical work that 
academic philosophers are engaged with, particularly if  those aspects dif-
fer from P4C in their methods and aims.
Take,  for example,  philosophical research into implicit bias and ste-
reotype threat. This is extremely impactful research, if  impact is mea-
sured by its implications for society. Implicit biases “are unconscious biases 
that affect the way we perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from the 
groups that our biases ‘target.’ Stereotype threat is sometimes consciously 
felt but also sometimes unconscious, and it concerns ways that a person’s 
(awareness of their) own group membership may negatively affect their 
performance” (Saul 2013, 39). Jennifer Saul and others working in this 
field apply this finding to issues in philosophy of language, social justice, 
and epistemology, showing that there is a need to be aware of implicit bias 
and stereotype threat because these lead to sexism, racism, homophobia, 
and other instances of prejudice and discrimination. Awareness of implicit 
bias and stereotype threat is the first step in reforming social structures and 
individual practice, and this is a moral imperative. A report by the Kirwan 
Institute claims that “addressing implicit bias on multiple levels (e.g., indi-
vidual and institutional) is critical for achieving social justice goals” (2016, 
15). The report identifies criminal justice, policing, health care, education, 
employment, and housing as particular areas of relevance.  This  line of 
philosophical research has an impact on how we view ourselves, the lan-
guage we use, how institutions function, government policy, interpersonal 
relations, politics, and so on. Being aware of implicit bias and stereotype 
threat is beneficial to society; there is clear scope for its extrinsic value.
If  communicating Saul’s research were the aim of a philosophy session, 
then P4C would not be the best way to do this. Non-directive dialogue 
about prejudice and discrimination is unlikely to reach the conclusion 
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that implicit bias and stereotype threat exist. By their very nature, implicit 
bias and stereotype threat are  unconscious, so it is unlikely that those 
engaged in a  CoI  would spontaneously come to conclude that they 
exist. Furthermore, people are resistant to the idea that they hold such 
biases. One of the most surprising features of implicit bias is that “psycho-
logical research over the last decades has shown that most people—even 
those who explicitly and sincerely avow egalitarian views—hold what have 
been described as implicit biases against such groups as blacks, women, 
gay people, and so on” (Saul 2013, 40). While a CoI might lead to sincere 
agreement that bias is wrong, the members of the CoI might continue to 
hold implicit biases without being aware of them. A better way of commu-
nicating Saul’s research is to add an explicatory element as to how her phil-
osophical work is presented to the public. In the case of this research, 
a public lecture would communicate the issues of importance in a way 
that the P4C model could not. Adding an element of dialogue afterwards 
would be good practice, but the aim of communicating the research is 
achieved through directive explication, not through the CoI. P4C is not 
always going to be appropriate to the aims of communicating philosoph-
ical research. In some cases,  a principled  P4C model might impede the 
communication of research by restricting the explication of impactful 
ideas with high extrinsic value.
P4C practitioners  might  argue that  Saul’s work could be communi-
cated through a principled P4C model if  Saul’s exposition of implicit bias 
and stereotype threat is used as the stimulus to frame the session. Non-
directive dialogue could then be facilitated around the research findings. 
This, however, only highlights the point that it is not the dialogue doing the 
valuable philosophical work here. Instead, the directive elements playing 
the role of communicating Saul’s research would be the impactful part of 
the session. Rather than using a P4C model focused on non-directive dia-
logue, the potential impact of Saul’s work would best be realised by com-
municating it clearly and directively, perhaps through a lecture followed by 
a discussion, maybe in a newspaper article, or possibly using a structured 
seminar or a directive lesson in a school.
Another example derives from whether or not moral education should 
be conducted using P4C. On the one hand,  the existence  of  “reason-
able disagreement about moral standards” means that directively  teach-
ing  moral standards  is controversial  (Hand 2018, 9). Hand argues, 
however, that there are certain moral standards that are not subject to 
reasonable disagreement and so can justifiably be  directively  taught. 
Accordingly, while non-directive moral inquiry might play an important 
role where moral standards are disputed, when it comes to justified moral 
standards we are warranted, and perhaps obliged, to communicate them 
using more directive methods (Hand 2018, 70). For example, in my work 
as a school teacher, when covering medical ethics as part of the religious 
education course in U.K. secondary schools, non-directive inquiry often 
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led students to the conclusion that genetic screening and genetic engineer-
ing offer attractive options to improve the health and quality of future 
lives. Often, the discussion would result in what amounted to an emerging 
endorsement of eugenics. It would be wrong, as a teacher, not to step in 
and point out the pitfalls of eugenics, and further to point out why eugen-
ics should not be taken seriously as a position. This can only be done direc-
tively, showing that  directive moral teaching  has value  and significance 
that would be difficult to realise using a principled P4C approach.
There is very little published empirical research on the extrin-
sic value of philosophy outside the P4C literature; Andrew Fisher and 
Jonathan Tallant “are aware of no attempts to distil specific peer-reviewed 
published philosophical research into child-friendly work-shops in order to 
bring about the kinds of positive, social impacts that traditional P4C ses-
sions have achieved” (2015, 10). This is something that they addressed in 
a small-scale empirical research project on the benefits of philosophy les-
sons in schools. The aim of the research was to  see “whether we could 
draw upon published research in high-ranking philosophy journals, done 
by professional philosophers at a research-intensive University, to bring 
about an impact  in a range of children’s lives” (3).  Rather than adopt-
ing a principled P4C model, Fisher and Tallant planned lessons with 
the research that they wanted to communicate in mind. They identified 
a few areas of research that seemed to have potential extrinsic value to 
school children and identified a particular aim that they thought might be 
achieved. They conclude, based on the data collected, that “it would seem 
that there is no obvious impediment to generating such positive social 
impacts” (13). They provide preliminary evidence that non-P4C models of 
philosophy can have extrinsic value.
My aim so far has been to show that there  is some potential extrin-
sic value to philosophy that could not be communicated using P4C. 
There might be more benefits stemming from academic philosophy than 
the lists  of benefits attributed to P4C.  However, further experimenta-
tion with different ways of engaging in philosophy and further empirical 
and theoretical research need to be conducted to establish whether this 
is the case. As Biesta points out, “Questions of definition and effect are 
important when philosophy is being mobilised to do something” (2011, 
306). P4C comes with a set of ready-made aims that might not match up 
with the research being communicated. Those wishing to use philosophi-
cal research to bring about extrinsic goods should not assume that P4C is 
the best model to achieve their aims. P4C literature sometimes carries the 
assumption that adherence to the P4C pedagogy trumps the content and 
aims of communicating philosophical research. This assumption might 
prevent certain benefits  of academic philosophical research  from being 
realised.
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The Extrinsic Value of P4C and the Extrinsic Value of Philosophy
The second complication raised by the distinctive nature of  a princi-
pled P4C model is that it is unclear whether the benefits of P4C are true 
of non-P4C models of philosophy. When academics give public philoso-
phy  lectures, publish  philosophical research  in  popular media, organise 
public-facing events such as cinema screenings, spend time doing philos-
ophy in organisations such as prisons or schools, or run seminars and lec-
tures for their own students, they might not be bringing about the same 
extrinsically valuable goods as someone who runs a principled P4C ses-
sion. I will argue that there are reasons for thinking that at least some 
of the proposed benefits of P4C are not necessarily brought about when 
philosophy is conducted using a different model.
The influential Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) evaluation 
of P4C (Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015) led to a raft of headlines endors-
ing the benefits of philosophy in education: “Philosophy sessions boost 
primary school results” (BBC 2015), “philosophical discussions boost 
pupil’s maths and literacy progress” (Guardian 2015), and “primary school 
children learn faster and fight less if  they study philosophy” (Times 2015). 
These headlines make misleading claims about philosophy because the 
evaluation was of SAPERE sessions. These sessions rely heavily on stu-
dent dialogue and take a non-directive teaching approach favouring facil-
itation; they take a principled P4C approach. The philosophical content 
is often limited to the facilitator guiding students to ask philosophi-
cal questions  and think philosophically, but the questions and answers 
discussed are those of the students. Headlines equating philosophy 
with SAPERE are thus misleading. It is unclear whether a public lecture 
or directive lesson with prescribed content would bring about all of the 
benefits attributed to P4C.
A lesson on the cosmological argument for the existence of God, which 
is commonly taught in secondary schools in the United Kingdom, would 
one hopes bring about greater knowledge and understanding of  the 
argument, and might lead to a change in attitude or behaviour concern-
ing discussions about the existence of God, but it is unclear whether  it 
would  improve students’ non-cognitive abilities, reverse harmful power 
dynamics, develop virtues, contribute to civic education, or be enjoyable 
and natural to students. It is dubious whether this model of philosophy 
would bring about any of the benefits associated with P4C. This is a single 
example of the divergence between the extrinsic value of P4C and other 
ways of engaging with philosophy. Although many facets of philosophy 
may share the extrinsic value associated with P4C, that this is so should 
not be taken for granted.
In the same way that the benefits of communicating some academic 
philosophical research  directively  might be precluded by taking a prin-
cipled P4C approach, some of the extrinsic value of a principled P4C 
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approach might be lost by taking other approaches to philosophy. P4C is 
not identical to philosophy, and so different approaches to doing philos-
ophy might be more appropriate than P4C in light of the aim of bringing 
about extrinsic goods associated with philosophy. Alternatively, a princi-
pled P4C approach might be the best model for achieving the stated aims. 
Either way, it is important to think carefully about which approach to take 
in order to best meet the aims being pursued. This is not a problem for phi-
losophy departments per se or for P4C per se; what it highlights is a lack 
of research into the extrinsic value of non-P4C philosophy. Since the P4C 
model and pedagogy are so distinctive, the claims of P4C are unlikely to 
apply to other models of philosophy, and since there is very little research 
into these other models of philosophy, we simply do not know whether 
they also have extrinsic value, or what this extrinsic value might be.
Dialogue and P4C Benefits
The final complication in the relationship between P4C and academic phi-
losophy is that the value of P4C is plausibly non-philosophical in origin 
and might be just as effectively realised without recourse to any philosoph-
ical content or method. The value of P4C might come from the princi-
pled emphasis on dialogue encouraged by non-directive inquiry.
The Communication Trust reported that “recent research put the aver-
age length of a pupil’s contribution to class discussion at just four words” 
(2013, 17). In light of this, it would be unsurprising if  an intervention 
that was almost entirely composed of student dialogue led to significant 
changes in how students felt about their education and their other les-
sons. In a small case study on the potential of P4C to develop classroom 
dialogue, it was reported that “the children experienced new and valued 
opportunities to express opinion in class during P4C sessions. All those 
interviewed emphasised the importance of this to them suggesting that it 
led to feelings of personal satisfaction and even joy” (Barrow 2015, 83). 
This highlights the centrality of dialogue to P4C and the possibility that it 
is increased classroom dialogue that explains many of the benefits of P4C.
As part of an investigation into the effect of classroom dialogue, 
Christine Howe and colleagues (2018) state that “three aspects of teach-
er-student dialogue strongly predicted performance on SATs when they 
occurred in combination (but not alone): elaboration, where building on, 
elaborating, evaluating, clarifying of a previous contribution was invited 
or provided; . . . querying, where a previous contribution was doubted, 
challenged,  rejected . . .  student participation,  where across the lesson 
multiple students were seen to engage with each other’s ideas, and not 
merely respond to their teacher’s questions.” These aspects of dialogue 
are all encouraged in P4C but are not exclusive to it. Howe’s work high-
lights the point  that classroom dialogue can take place in subjects that 
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are already on the curriculum and does not require any inclusion of phi-
losophy. In addition, the conclusion that dialogue can raise attainment in 
SATs is remarkably similar to the conclusions of the EEF report show-
ing that P4C improved attainment in Cognitive Ability Test (CAT) scores 
in those participating in sessions (Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015). It is 
worth reflecting on whether the extrinsic value of P4C is more closely tied 
to the emphasis of principled P4C on dialogue, rather than to the connec-
tion between P4C and philosophy.
Dialogue as part of the CoI might be driving improvements in maths 
and reading results in the EEF study, but what else can we attribute to 
it? Many of the claims made about P4C might be the result of dialogue. 
Lipman’s claim that P4C develops creative, caring, and critical thinking 
can plausibly be attributed to dialogue. Discussing important ideas with 
peers in a non-judgemental and supportive classroom environment might 
explain  these benefits. Similarly, improvements in democratic participa-
tion are plausibly the result of becoming better acquainted with classmates 
and learning how to interact with them to negotiate new shared under-
standings of controversial ideas. Free and open discussion of questions 
that interest children might help them to bring meaning to their experi-
ences and to come to understand one another’s perspectives. Learning to 
interact with one another under the watchful eye of a facilitator whilst 
dealing with tricky issues seems like an excellent way of developing epis-
temic and moral virtues. The CoI encourages children to interact with one 
another in a way that is often stifled by a busy school curriculum. These 
benefits might not transfer to models of philosophy that do not emphasise 
dialogue in the same way.
If  this is correct, and the extrinsic value of P4C derives from 
the CoI rather than philosophical content, then perhaps the conclusion 
is that those involved in demonstrating the extrinsic value of philosophy 
should adopt the CoI as part of their pedagogy and side-line other fac-
ets of academic philosophy. This, however, returns us to the first problem 
highlighted: that strict adherence to principled P4C precludes certain ben-
efits of philosophy from being communicated. Another potential response 
to the idea that the benefits of P4C are related to dialogue  rather than 
to philosophy is to claim that all philosophy is necessarily dialogical, and 
all dialogue is philosophical. This, however, misconstrues the relationship 
between philosophy and dialogue. Philosophy can be conducted dialogi-
cally, and Socratic dialogue plays a central role in Western philosophy, but 
philosophy is not necessarily dialogical. Philosophy can be a solitary pur-
suit; for example, plenty of philosophical writing occurs alone. Personal 
reflection and introspection on philosophical questions are other aspects 
of philosophy that do not involve dialogue. Furthermore, dialogue might 
harm philosophical thinking if  it is mismanaged so that quieter people are 
side-lined or carefully thought-out views are carelessly undermined.
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Some might respond that dialogue and philosophy are too tightly inter-
twined to be separated. For example, Peter Worley argues that the key to 
philosophical thinking is “external and internal” Socratic dialogue that 
“has become a standard method in philosophy” (2009, 150). While there 
are reasons for agreeing that philosophy is closely linked to dialogue, the 
idea that all dialogue is philosophical requires substantiation. Philosophy 
does not have a monopoly over dialogue, and if  philosophy is to have dis-
tinctive extrinsic value, or impact, then this sort of dialogue needs to be 
differentiated from the sort of dialogue that regularly takes place in book 
clubs, political meetings, and social gatherings. The onus is on the philo-
sophical community to identify exactly what it is that makes philosophical 
dialogue distinctive. This is not an impossible task, but it is necessary if  
claims about the extrinsic value of P4C are to be transferred to claims 
about the extrinsic value of a broader range of academic philosophical 
activities.
If  philosophers choose to champion dialogue and downplay philosophi-
cal content, then they risk severing the link between their academic research 
and the extrinsic value that they are under pressure to demonstrate. Fisher 
and Tallant point out that studies on the benefits of P4C are problem-
atic because “none of them deploy contemporary philosophical research 
to try to bring about the benefits described” (2015,  2).  Alternatively, 
claiming that non-P4C models of philosophy bring about the benefits 
associated with P4C needs independent justification because it is plausible 
that the benefits of P4C are linked to dialogue, whereas dialogue might 
be absent  in non-P4C models of philosophy. For example, since public 
lectures rarely employ  substantial non-directive  dialogue in the sense 
encouraged by P4C, the benefits associated with the  CoI  are unlikely 
to be realised during a public lecture. The principled nature of the P4C 
model means that its benefits are not necessarily identical to the benefits 
of other possible models for philosophical activity.
Conclusion
Clearly, the P4C model brings many associated benefits and can achieve 
worthy aims. Its extrinsic value has been well researched, and there is a 
body of empirical and theoretical literature that sheds light on this value. 
In addition, P4C can be practised in a way that draws on multiple tradi-
tions and avoids the pitfalls of taking a principled P4C approach. Take 
for instance Graeme Tiffany’s work to use community philosophy “to 
promote conversations and develop positive relationships between dif-
ferent groups of people within a community” (2009, 1). Since Tiffany’s 
aim seems best achieved through the caring, critical, and creative think-
ing fostered by dialogue within a CoI, P4C seems an excellent fit. In fact, 
Tiffany was mindful of the aims of his work and “drew on two traditions: 
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first, the experience of Philosophy for Children (P4C) and especially its 
method of Community of Enquiry; and, second, the informal education 
sector and its emphasis on relationships, democracy and mutual learning. 
A major conclusion of the project was that authentic practice required 
elements of both these traditions, but differed from them” (2009, 5). This 
sort of careful evaluation of whether principled P4C is the best approach, 
and the willingness to learn from rather than fully adopt a principled P4C 
model, is exemplary.
P4C can be an excellent model with which to have a positive impact 
on society using philosophy, but only if  it is the right instrument for the 
stated aims. If  P4C is the wrong instrument, then those attempting to rec-
reate the extrinsic value associated with P4C risk preventing the poten-
tial benefits of their research from being realised. They might be using 
the P4C model where a different model would have been more appropri-
ate. They also risk making claims about the extrinsic value of philosophy 
that would be true of P4C  but  are  not true of the model of philoso-
phy they are employing.  Uncritically adopting  a principled P4C model 
might undermine claims about the extrinsic value of philosophy because 
these can be reduced  to claims about the value of dialogue. This leaves 
philosophy departments in a difficult position, since they have little dis-
tinctive extrinsic value to offer individuals and society if  all they can lay 
claim to is another forum for dialogue that could be achieved by existing 
non-philosophical means.
As philosophy departments come under more pressure to demonstrate 
some  positive impact on society, they should not  automatically  turn to 
P4C. Instead, they should think carefully about the potential extrin-
sic value of their own philosophical activities. Sometimes this will align 
with the value of P4C, but at other times the two will not marry. In these 
cases, those working in academic philosophy departments would do well 
to investigate the potential value of their philosophical research and to 
experiment with new and existing models of philosophical activity. Many 
questions about the impact of philosophy remain neglected, such as: Are 
there further potential benefits to taking philosophy into schools beyond 
those advocated by P4C practitioners? What is the value of philosophical 
research conclusions and philosophical theories? What is philosophical 
thinking? How is philosophical dialogue distinctive? There is a long way to 
go towards identifying whether and how philosophy is extrinsically valu-
able despite the large body of work on the extrinsic value of P4C.
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